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ESSAY
Current Challenges to Free Expression: A
New Age of Repression?
By GEOFFREY R. STONE*
In recent years, we have witnessed a succession of sharp chal-
lenges to the principle of free expression. I would like in this essay to
explore some of the implications of these challenges. I would like to
begin with just a few of many possible examples.
First, as you may recall, there was the "Art Institute" incident
in Chicago. Each spring, the students graduating from the school at
the Art Institute participate in an exhibition and competition. In 1988,
one of those students chose to exhibit a painting of the late Mayor
Harold Washington which depicted the Mayor wearing women's
lingerie. Within an hour, members of the school staff, offended by
the painting, demanded its removal. Later that day, the Chicago City
Council adopted a resolution stating that, whereas the painting "is a
disgrace to the Mayor" and "to the citizens of the City," "all funds
contributed by the City to the Art Institute shall be withheld until the
painting is removed." Shortly thereafter, nine Chicago aldermen
arrived at the Art Institute and, over the protests of the students,
physically removed the painting from the exhibit. The next day, the
Art Institute issued a statement announcing that it would not there-
after display the painting.
Second, there is the Jerry Falwell-Hustler dispute. As you may
know, Campari Liqueur ran a series of ads that included interviews
with celebrities about the "first time" they had tried Campari. The
ads clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject
of "first times." A recent issue of Hustler magazine featured a parody
of the Campari ads, presenting a purported interview with Falwell in
which he stated that his "first time" was during a drunken rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued. The jury ruled for
Falwell on his claim that the parody constituted the intentional
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University
of Chicago.
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infliction of emotional distress and awarded him damages in the
amount of $150,000.
Third, there is the question of pornography.' Following the lead
of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, many feminists have
urged the enactment of legislation that would restrict "pornographic,"
as distinct from "obscene," expression on the ground that porno-
graphic material employs sexuality to oppress and subordinate women.2
Adopting this view, the city of Indianapolis enacted an ordinance
prohibiting the production, distribution, exhibition or possession of
any material that depicts "the graphic sexually explicit subordination
of women"' and that presents women "as sexual objects who enjoy
pain or humiliation," ' 4 or in "positions of servility or submission or
display." 5
Fourth, there is the issue of flag burning.' At the 1984 Republican
National Convention, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag
to express his opposition to government policy. He was prosecuted
and convicted of violating a Texas statute7 that prohibited any person
from desecrating the American flag. The Supreme Court held the
Texas statute unconstitutional.' An outraged Congress then enacted
federal legislation designed to circumvent the Court's decision.9 After
the Court invalidated that legislation as well, President Bush called
for a constitutional amendment to overrule the two Supreme Court
decisions. A majority of the members of both Houses of Congress
voted to enact the proposed amendment, but failed to muster the two
thirds majority required by the Constitution.
1. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as View-
point-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986).
2. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY (1981); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, & Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985).
3. INDIANAPOLIS, IN., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984) (invalidated as contrary to the
First Amendment by American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985)).
4. Id. § 16-3(q)(1).
5. Id. § 16-3(q)(6).
6. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning & the Constitution, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 111 (1989).
7. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989).
8. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
9. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1 1989) (declared void as a violation of the First Amendment
by United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).
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Fifth, there is the controversy over hate-speech on university
campuses.' 0 In response to a series of incidents in which students were
insulted or harassed because of their race, gender, or sexual orienta-
tion, a number of universities adopted regulations prohibiting such
expression on campus. The University of Connecticut, for example,
prohibited the use of "derogatory names"; the University of Penn-
sylvania prohibited the use of language that "stigmatizes or victimizes
individuals" and that "creates an intimidating environment"; and the
University of Michigan prohibited any person from stigmatizing "an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex or sexual
orientation" where the "reasonably foreseeable effect" is to interfere
with the victim's "academic efforts."" The University of Michigan
regulation, by the way, was thereafter invoked against one student
who stated in a social work class that he believed homosexuality to
be a treatable disease and against another who stated in a dentistry
class that he had heard that minorities had had an especially difficult
time in that class.
Finally, there is the controversy at the National Endowment for
the Arts (NEA). When it became known that the NEA had supported
the work of Andres Serrano, including "Piss-Christ," a photograph
of a plastic crucifix in a jar of urine, and Robert Mapplethorp,
including a series of photographs explicitly depicting homoeroticism,
various members of Congress directly attacked the NEA. Represen-
tative Philip Crane of Illinois, for example, called for the complete
abolition of the NEA, and Senator Jesse Helms proposed legislation
prohibiting the NEA from supporting any work depicting sadomaso-
chism or homoeroticism, denigrating the objects or beliefs of any
religion, or debasing any person on the basis of race, sex, handicap,
age, or national origin.
This list is not, of course, exhaustive. One could add the effort
in Florida to suppress the rap group 2 Live Crew, the efforts of
prosecutors in Idaho to close the Church of Jesus Christ Christian/
Aryan Nations, a neo-Nazi group, by having it declared a "public
nuisance," the effort of the Federal Communications Commission to
impose a 24-hour-a-day ban on "indecent" broadcasting, 2 and more.
There is a common theme in all these examples. In each instance,
the effort to restrict expression is premised on the belief that the
10. See generally Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989); Timothy B. Zollinger, Casenote, 12 N. ILL. U. L. Rv. 159 (1991).
11. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 856.
12. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1991).
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particular speech at issue is unwise, disagreeable, inappropriate, or
offensive. In each instance, the effort to restrict expression reflects
an intolerance of dissident or offensive or outrageous speech and a
paternalistic desire to dictate what speech our citizens should - and
should not - be trusted to hear or see.
Taken together, these incidents reflect a trend that, at the very
least, calls into question some of the most fundamental premises of
our free speech tradition. Moreover, and more profoundly, these
incidents may signal the dawn of a new age of repression, an age in
which the right of one person to speak freely will turn on the
sensitivities - or insensitivities - of others. In this new age, we may
see increasing restrictions of expression as government caters to the
fear, prejudices, and insecurities of those who are unwilling to tolerate
speech they find disagreeable, offensive, or unwise. It is a disquieting
prospect, indeed.
Why now? What circumstances have brought forth this extraor-
dinary succession of efforts to suppress offensive expression? There
can be little doubt that this phenomenon is due, in part, to almost a
decade of national leadership that has turned its back on civil rights
and civil liberties and that has failed to reinforce in our citizenry and
in our government policy those values of tolerance, open-mindedness,
and diversity that should be at the very core of a free and self-
governing society. From the Meese Commission on Pornography, to
the FCC's restrictions of "indecent" expression," to candidate Bush's
manipulations of the pledge of allegiance in the 1988 campaign, to
President Bush's exploitation of flag burning for partisan political
advantage, the national administration has reinforced and encouraged
intolerance, self-righteousness, and suppression.
This is not, however, a complete explanation, for many of the
incidents I have described were triggered, not by the political right,
but by the political left. Indeed, women, blacks, and gays have been
among the most vehement advocates of suppressing speech they find
offensive. This is especially troubling. For although one can readily
appreciate why these groups have come to think that pornographic,
misogynist, racist, and homophobic speech contributes to their sub-
ordination, and although one can readily understand why they regard
the toleration of such expression as a threat and its suppression as
empowerment, one would nonetheless hope that these groups would
also appreciate that their own best chance for gaining full legal
protection lies, not in a dilution of the rights and liberties of others,
13. E.g., id.
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but in a deeper and more universal commitment to the values of
tolerance, diversity, and open-mindedness.
Now, a moment ago, I suggested - rather cavalierly - that we
may be on the brink of a new age of repression. In fact, we should
not be too quick to leap to that conclusion. A critical feature of the
incidents I have described is that they involve efforts to restrict speech
that would not have been thought protected by the First Amendment
until quite recently. It is unlikely, for example, that twenty-five years
ago a court would have interpreted the First Amendment as prohib-
iting a public university from disciplining students for holding a mock
slave auction in black face or for telling racist jokes on a university
owned radio station, the sorts of incidents that led to the promulgation
of campus hate-speech regulations.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court first confronted the flag
burning issue in 1969,14 even such "liberal" Justices as Hugo Black,
Abe Fortas, and Earl Warren went out of their way to observe that
nothing in the United States Constitution prevented "the States and
the Federal Government" from protecting "the flag from acts of
desecration and disgrace."
And there can be little doubt that, when the Supreme Court first
considered the question of obscenity in 1957, against the background
of the suppression of such works as Theordore Dreiser's An American
Tragedy, James Joyce's Ulysses, and D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatter-
ly's Lover, it could not have imagined that First Amendment doctrine
would evolve to the point where Hustler, movies graphically depicting
the sadistic sexual abuse of women, Andres Serrano's "Piss-Christ,"
and Robert Mapplethorp's photograph of a bullwhip extruding from
his own anus would be claimed with a straight-face to be non-obscene,
constitutionally protected expression - to say nothing of the claim
that the government, through the National Endowment for the Arts,
is constitutionally compelled to pay Serrano and Mapplethorp to
produce such works.
What we see in these incidents, then, may best be understood,
not necessarily as the dawn of a new age of repression, but, perhaps,
as a last-ditch effort to forestall the virtually complete abolition of
governmentally-enforced standards of decency and civility in public
discourse. These incidents may represent, not an effort to turn back
the clock to 1930 or 1957 or 1969, but an effort by those who have
already been backed to the wall to draw one final line in the sand.
The plain fact is that as our free speech tradition has evolved, we
14. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
1992:4251
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have come to demand ever more toleration of our citizens. And
viewed from this perspective, we should, perhaps, be more understand-
ing of those who, like Jesse Helms, the Chicago aldermen, George
Bush, Jerry Falwell, Catharine MacKinnon, and the University of
Michigan, sometimes find it more difficult to comply with the demand
that we tolerate ever more outrageous expression.
Moreover, in attempting to understand this phenomenon, it is
important to note that, viewed on their own terms, each of these
incidents may be seen as a relatively narrow and indeed, quite
reasonable effort to limit expression. Consider, for example, pornog-
raphy. The speech restricted by such legislation is, by definition,
sexually explicit and non-political. It does not expressly address any
issue of public or political concern. Indeed, it would be hard to argue
that the process of self-government would be seriously threatened by
a reduction in the availability of material that graphically depicts the
subordination of women as sexual objects who enjoy pain and hu-
miliation. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that, at least at
the margin, pornography does, indeed, reinforce the image of women
as sexual objects and thus increase the incidents of both violence and
discrimination. In light of these considerations, one might quite
reasonably conclude that little would be lost, and perhaps much
gained, by restricting pornographic expression.
Consider also racist, sexist, and homophobic speech in the uni-
versity setting. There can be no doubt that the more egregious forms
of such expression can be degrading, hurtful, and intimidating to its
victims. In a university setting, in which full and free discussion is a
central aspiration, the failure to suppress such speech may, ironically,
have a dampening effect on open and robust debate, for such speech
may intimidate its victims, render them outcasts, and effectively silence
them as contributing members of the community. The net effect of
tolerating such expression may thus be to inhibit rather than to
promote free and open discourse.
Similarly, consider the efforts to restrict the NEA. Although
government may not ban offensive art, it does not necessarily follow
that it must therefore subsidize such art. Surely, government is under
no constitutional obligation to establish the NEA in the first place.
Why, then, if it chooses to fund some art, should it be precluded
from exercising reasonable judgment about the types of art it will
support? For example, although government cannot ban "bad" art,
it surely is under no constitutional obligation to fund "bad" art, even
if it funds "good" art. Why, then, must government fund art that
denigrates religion, or promotes unlawful or undesirable conduct, or
is inappropriate for children, or deeply offends others? There is a
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common sense difference between suppression and failure to subsidize,
and government arguably should have greater discretion in the latter
situation than in the former.
Finally, consider flag burning. For more than two hundred years
the American flag has served as a unique and powerful symbol of
national unity. Government could quite reasonably conclude that any
physical abuse of the flag dilutes its symbolic value to the nation.
Moreover, legislation directed at flag desecration does not in any
meaningful way suppress anyone's speech, for those who would burn
the flag as a means of expression have available to them innumerable
other ways through which to express their views. They can criticize
the flag or the nation or the specific policies they oppose; they can
distribute leaflets, march, picket, use loudspeakers and make speeches;
they can tear the Constitution, burn the president in effigy, and smash
models of the Capitol. In short, flag desecration statutes may serve a
legitimate governmental interest without in any appreciable way inter-
fering with the opportunities for free expression.
Similar arguments could, of course, be made with respect to the
Art Institute and Hustler situations as well, but I will spare you the
effort. My basic point, however, is clear. In each of these situations,
there is at least a reasonable basis for the claim to restrict expression.
Accordingly, these efforts to limit speech cannot fairly be dismissed
as draconian or as profoundly incompatible with the essential prere-
quisites of a free and open society. Their adoption would not make
a mockery of the First Amendment or cause the Republic to fall.
Reasonableness, however, is not, and cannot be, the constitu-
tional standard for government efforts to restrict speech because the
message is unwise, disagreeable, harmful, or offensive. To the con-
trary, if there is a central principle in our First Amendment jurispru-
dence, it is that government ordinarily may not restrict expression for
such reasons, for such suppression distorts public debate, mutilates
the thought process of the community, violates the equality of status
in the field of ideas and elevates the government to the role of platonic
censor. Thus, in such circumstances, the First Amendment prohibits
even seemingly reasonable efforts to restrict free expression.
As history teaches us, there is a serious risk of distorting public
debate whenever we attempt to assess the reasonableness of such
statutes on a case by case basis. This is so because ad hoc evaluations
of the reasonableness of statutes that restrict the expression of partic-
ular messages are especially likely to become involved with the ideo-
logical predispositions of those doing the evaluating. There is a
danger, in other words, that legislators, judges, and jurors - to say
nothing of advocates - will be influenced by conscious or unconscious
1992:425]
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biases that will undermine their ability to evaluate accurately and
impartially both the costs of the restriction and the benefits to be
gained. The safest, the most sensible course in such circumstances is
to overprotect the right of free speech - to invalidate even "seem-
ingly" reasonable restrictions - in order to insure that we do not
inadvertently and discriminatorily underprotect the right of free ex-
pression.
The wisdom of this approach is evident in the six incidents with
which I began. In each instance, the advocates of restriction are
vehement about the wisdom of their approach. In each instance, the
advocates of restriction assert that their claim is distinguishable from
and stronger than the others. In fact, however, there is no firmly
principled reason to accept any one of these claims without accepting
the others. And although accepting any one of these claims may not
have seriously deleterious consequences for the system of free expres-
sion, accepting them all - and accepting all of those that inevitably
would follow - would have deleterious consequences, indeed. Put
simply, to accept these sorts of arguments for restricting speech
because of its message would invite an analogical stampede that would
eventually swallow the First Amendment itself.
I would like to conclude with a few words about the role of the
judiciary in interpreting and enforcing the First Amendment. It is
instructive, I think, that most of the disputes with which I began this
essay have thus far been resolved in a manner that is highly protective
of the right of free expression. This is due largely to the intervention
of the federal courts. The Supreme Court unanimously invalidated
the $150,000 judgment won by Falwell against Hustler, holding that
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
such circumstances is absolutely forbidden by the First Amendment. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated
the Indianapolis pornography ordinance, holding that it violated the
core First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. 6 A
United States District Court in Michigan invalidated the University of
Michigan's restriction on campus hate-speech, holding that it was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 7
The Supreme Court invalidated both the Texas flag desecration
statute 8 and the federal Flag Protection Act, 9 holding that they
15. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
16. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
17. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see
also Zollinger, supra note 10.
18. TExAs PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1 1989) (declared void as a violation of the First
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violated the "bedrock" First Amendment principle that government
may not restrict speech because the ideas are offensive to others.20
And, although the NEA issue remains a subject of controversy, the
debate has been shaped - and sharply narrowed - by continued
reference to the principles of free expression that the Supreme Court
has articulated and enforced over the years. Thus, although it is
fashionable these days to question whether courts make a difference,
there can be little doubt, that in this corner of constitutional law,
they make a significant difference, indeed.
We have recently witnessed the retirements of two of the greatest
defenders of free expression our nation has ever known. For some
thirty-five years, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall
offered a powerful vision of free expression as a central component
of our constitutional system. Whether dealing with the Communists
or the Klansmen, civil rights demonstrators or anti-war protestors,
flag burners or leafleteers, they articulated a broad conception of
freedom of speech that has produced a more tolerant, a more open,
and a more enlightened society. Can we continue to rely on the
Supreme Court to articulate and defend this vision of free expression?
I fear not. If last Term's decisions in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,21
upholding a complete ban on nude dancing, and Rust v. Sullivan,22
upholding a federal regulation23 prohibiting federally-funded family
planning clinics from informing women of their constitutional right
to abortion, are any indication of the Court's future direction, we are
in for hard times, indeed.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1 1989) (declared void as a violation of the First
Amendment by United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).
20. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310 (1990).
21. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
22. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
23. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1991).
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